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ACCOUNTABIITy AND DEMOCRACY IN THE CASE OF USING FORCE
UNDER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES
by Charlotte Ku and Harold K. Jacobson'
This presentation derives from a large research project that has been more than three
vears in progress and reflects the work of a multinational team oflawyers, policy analysts,
and political scientists. The project is supported by the Ford Foundation and-will conclude
at the end of 2000 with the completion of a book that will cover the experience of nine
democracies in deploying their military forces under international auspices as this
experince relates to two large questions.
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The project examines two questions:
• What is the interactive relationship between international commitments and national
constitutional and political requirements?
" How does this relationship work for democracies, and does it ensure accountability,
including democratic accountability for decisions made by international institutions?
The reason for examining these two questions at this time stems from two sets of
circumstances evident since the end of the Cold War in 1989:
" In contrast to the final days of World Wars I and H, when much thinking and planning
was given to the order and structure of the world to come, there seemed to be little
preparation for the end of the Cold War. Leaders met at a glittering summit in Paris
in 1990 to proclaim the triumph of democracy, but left with few details on how this
was to be maintained.
" There seemed to be an unspoken assumption that the post-World War II security
system, whose effective functioning had been stalled by the Cold War, would now be
allowed to function. The UN Security Council met at the head-of-government level
in January 1992 to consider the role of the postwar system, but events, particularly as
related to intrastate conflict, indicate the inadequacy of this assumption.
But why examine democracies and why examine issues of the use of military forces?
Democracies, starting with the United States, are world powers that play crucial roles in
maintaining international order. Democracies require some measure ofpopular support for actions
taken by their governments. The question for this project is: What level of popular support and
what level of accountability are required, and how are these achieved in democracies? These
questions are fundamental to assessing the viability of any post-Cold War security system.
The military action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo added
an unexpected element to the study after the project got underway, and introduced the
international legal ambiguities and national questions of acting without the authorization of the
UN Security Council. The Kosovo action demonstrated that the post-Cold War system as a
revival of the post-World War II system was not adequate to address the conflicts of the post-
Cold War period, and that the security packages represented by the United Nations and NATO
needed to be reconsidered both internationally and nationally to fit the problems of today.
THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Although military forces have been used under the auspices of the Organization of American
States, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Organization of East
Caribbean States and others, we focus on the United Nations and NATO for three reasons:
1. the centrality of the United Nations and the large number of occasions that it has
authorized the use of military forces;
2. the fact that NATO maintains a standing military force that has now been deployed
in serious military operations; and
3. the fact that NATO's member states are all democracies.
Our study explores the historical experience in nine countries concerning the use of
military forces under international auspices: Canada, France, Germany, India, Japan, Norway,
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the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries are all
democracies, and all have contributed military forces to a variety of military operations
conducted under UN auspices; the six that are members of NATO have contributed forces to
its military operations. Four (France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are
permanent members of the UN Security Council, and three (Germany, India, and Japan) aspire
to be permanent members of the Security Council. Two (Canada and Norway) are among the
states that have traditionally been committed to and provided substantial support for inter-
national causes. These nine countries furthermore have a crucial military capability.
Our study explores the experiences of these countries in order to clarify what processes
on the domestic level have developed to accompany the evolution of the uses of force on the
international level. We explore how the international community has moved toward using
military forces under the auspices of international institutions for collective purposes while at
the same time maintaining accountability in democracies at national and individual levels.
We focus on the internal situation only because of its importance in assuring the
effectiveness of international decisions, although we acknowledge that questions of democratic
process also apply to international institutions and decision-making processes. We are inter-
ested in the nexus of the international and the domestic because we believe that unless this is
understood and provided for, the project of placing limits on the unilateral use of force and
establishing mechanisms so that force can be used under the auspices of international
institutions for collective purposes will be severely constrained.
CONTROLLING THE USES OF FORCE
The historic evolution in control over the use of force-creating the monopoly of
coercion-was a crucial feature of the creation of modem nation-states. For democracies,
ensuring that there would be accountability for the use of military forces was a central
component of the struggle to establish democratic forms of government in these states. At the
same time, states have struggled to balance the democratic requirements of debate, consensus
building, and consent with the exigencies of national defense. National defense is the chief
concern of most states where military forces are concerned, and within limits broad discretion
is allowed the executive in order to respond to security crises. Can the same system of
accountability apply when military forces are used under the auspices of international
institutions? Have domestic norms, including those of democratic accountability, evolved to
support the international institutions and decisions that are now in operation? Are questions of
accountability different if force is used under national or international auspices, or are the
issues essentially the same?
Generalizing from the experience of the United Nations and NATO since World War II,
the use of military forces under international auspices can be placed in five broad categories
that can be described by their general purposes.' These have in common collective action and
include variations on the ideal of collective security in the more robust forms of action. Each
derives either explicitly or implicitly from some form of legal mandate through decisions of
bodies like the UN Security Council authorized by states to make such decisions.
Although now widely accepted as legally permitted practices, as variants of collective
security. their legal bases were not without controversy when first introduced and were
scrutinized by scholars and commentators in their early history.2 The categories arebased on the
number of military personnel involved, their mandate and their rules of engagement, and
Thi, categorization draws heavily on the concepts developed in GARETH EvANs, COOPERATING FOR PEACE:
THE GLOB %L AGENDA FOR THE 1990s AND BEYOND (1993). It is related to but different from the categorization
developed hy BOTROs BOUTROS-GHAI, AN AGENDA FOR PEACE (1992). Of course, it draws more broadly on the
% ide lterature concerning peacekeeping, including PAUL F. DIE-L, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING (1993); UN
PE %CEK-EPING, AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE UNCIVIL WARS OFTHE 1990S 0villiam J. Durch ed.), (1996); A CRISIS
I' ExPt-T \ITIOms: UN PE ,CEKEEPING IN THE 1990S (Ramesh Thakur & Carlyle A. Tayer eds.), (1995); and JAMES
S S TRULIN. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE IAUNTENANCEOFINTERNATIONALSEcURITY: ACHALLENGETOBEMEr
O1995P.
,,O, car Schachter, INT'ERN ,ATIONAL LAw IN THIEORY AND PRACrICE 389-417 (1991).
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whether or not they enter the territory of the state where they operate with the consent of that
state. The five categories are:
1. Monitoring and observation. Eighteen of the deployments of military force under the
auspices of the United Nations have been for the purpose of monitoring and observation.
Eleven of these missions were started before 1990 (starting with the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization in 1949) and seven after 1990. Monitoring and
observation missions constituted almost 60 percent of the United Nations' deployments
before 1990, but less than 20 percent of the deployments after 1990.
2. Traditionalpeacekeeping. In all, there have only been four traditional peacekeeping
forces: United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), the United Nations Force in
Cyprus (UNFCYP), UNEF II, and the United Nations Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
All of these forces were originally deployed prior to 1990.
3. Peacekeeping plus state building. The exemplar case of peacekeeping plus state
building is the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
UNTAC was authorized in 1992 and involved more than 20,000 personnel. There
have been twenty-five cases of peacekeeping plus state building, and all but two of
these were deployed after 1990.
4. Force to ensure compliance with international mandates. Established in 1960, the
United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC, or ONUC, for Organisation des
Nations Unies au Congo) provided the first instance in which military forces deployed
under UN auspices used force to ensure compliance with an international mandate.
All of the forces deployed by the United Nations and NATO in the former Yugoslavia
would be in this category. Four of the fifty-four military forces deployed under UN
auspices fall in this category, as do all four of those deployed by NATO. NATO's
International Force (IFOR) was the largest of these military operations. It included
more than 60,000 personnel. Of the deployments of force in this category, only
ONUC occurred before 1990.
5. Enforcement. The UN-sponsored operations in Korea and Kuwait are the two cases
of enforcement action. The Korean operation involved close to a million personnel,
and the Kuwait operation almost 800,000. UN forces suffered 95,000 fatalities in the
Korean War, but only 240 in the Gulf War.
The categorization of the fifty-eight instances in which military force has been used under
the auspices of the United Nations and NATO is summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Uses of Forces Under the Auspices of the United Nations and NATO
Forms of use of force Period
1946-1989 1990-1999
Monitoring and
observation
Traditional peacekeeping
Peacekeeping plus state
building
Force to ensure
compliance
Enforcement
Total
In Table 1, the uses of military forces are classified according to their ultimate purpose.
In some cases, missions started off modestly and subsequently were expanded. Table 1 divides
11(57.9%) 7(17.9%)
4(21.0%) 0
2 (10.5%) 23 (59.0%)
1(5.3%) 8 (20.5%)
1(5.3%) 1(2.6%)
19 (100%) 39 (100%)
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the instances in which military forces were deployed into two periods, during the Cold War and
after the Cold War.
Table 1 shows clearly that military forces were used under international auspices by the
United Nations and NATO much more frequently in the decade starting in 1990 than they were
used in the preceding four decades. They were used nineteen times between 1945 and 1989,
but they were used thirty-nine times between 1990 and 1999. The table also shows clearly that
the forms of the use of force were quite different in the two periods. Monitoring and
observation missions constituted almost 60 percent of the deployments of military force in the
first period, while in the second period they constituted less than 20 percent of the deploy-
ments.
In sharp contrast to the missions deployed only with the consent of the host state, many
of the uses of force in the 1990s were deployed without the consent of the host state, and
consequently were more intrusive in its affairs. They were also used much more frequently in
intrastate conflicts. Roughly one out of five deployments in the earlier period was in an
intrastate dispute; almost nine out of ten deployments in the latter period were in intrastate
disputes. The increasing involvement of military forces acting under the auspices of inter-
national institutions in intrastate conflicts reflects a broad development in international affairs.
Of the fifty-eight deployments, sixteen (27.6 percent) were in Europe, fourteen (24.1
percent) in Sub-Saharan Africa, thirteen (22.4 percent) in North Africa and the Middle East,
seven ( 12.1 percent) in the Americas, five (8.6 percent) in East Asia and the Pacific, and three
(5.2 percent) in South Asia. For operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations
other than the Korean War, the mean number of fatalities resulting from military actions by the
forces wxas less than thirty-eight; the mean cost of a deployment was $210,000,000.
IDENTIFYING AREAS OF AccouNTABILrrY
History and experience regarding the use of force under international auspices have
produced questions concerning forms for authorization, national responsibility, and individual
responsibility for the conduct of operations in the field. As the forms of the use of force have
multiplied, so have the questions of authority and responsibility in deciding to deploy troops,
to select military and political objectives, and to incur risk. These raise issues of linking the
requirements of domestic accountability in democracies to decisions and actions taken
internationally and collectively.
Five forms of authorization and responsibility can be identified, each of which raises its
own set of accountability issues:
I. international authorization to deploy military forces;
2. national authorization to deploy military forces;
3. civilianlpolitical control of military personnel and operations;
4. civilians' responsibility to the military for their safety; and
5. responsibility to comply with norms governing the conduct of soldiers and other
international personnel in the field.
Democratic governments over time have developed internal procedures that cover the last
four of these issues. These procedures are embedded in constitutions and political and military
traditions. A considerable body of moral doctrine that can be used to guide choices with respect
to these issues has also been developed. The just war doctrine is a notable example. The first
issue is newer and arises as a consequence of the effort to shift the legitimate use of force from
nation-states to international institutions and from interstate to intrastate conflict. While there
are bodies of doctrine with respect to the last four issues, it is not clear how these should be
applied when forces are being used under the auspices of an international institution. Some of
the implications with respect to each of the issues are discussed below.
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Table 2 combines the categories relating to the forms of use of force and the forms of
authorization and responsibility. This matrix provides an organizing framework for under-
standing where and how international and national systems interact. It is based on the assump-
tion that different uses of military force will raise issues of accountability in different ways.
The basic hypothesis is that the greater the risk to soldiers' lives, the longer the duration of the
operation, and the less certain the outcome of an operation, the greater the demand will be for
review by domestic institutions to enforce accountability. This is not to say, however, that we
consider democracies incapable of long engagements. It is just that long engagements may
require different internal processes and points of accountability from those required for short
ones.
Table 2: Uses of Military Forces and Forms of Authorization and Responsibility
Forms of authorization and responsibility
Forms of uses International National Civilian Civilian Responsibility
of military authorization authorization control responsibility to comply with
forces to military norms
Monitoring and
observation
Traditional
peacekeeping
Peacekeeping
plus state build-
ing
Force to ensure
compliance
Enforcement
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATION TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES
The accountability here is to provide a mandate to use military forces in accordance with
international law and practice. It is further to provide the basis for a viable operation using
national resources. Much collective action has been taken that for the most part is accepted
international practice raising few questions of accountability. So of five forms of force, the
major focus is on the two most robust-force to ensure compliance with international mandates
and enforcement.
In these cases, a particularly relevant question is how international decisions can provide
for the relevant requirements of accountability in the uses of military forces by particular
democracies. The Security Council was set up to put decision making in the hands of those
with the greatest capacity, but is this basis for decision making adequate to address situations
of humanitarian crisis where the objective tests and bases for international action may be open
to question? Does it matter if the decision makers are those who will have principal roles in
carrying out the decisions?
The United States and the United Kingdom have been the leading proponents of the view
that when the Security Council cannot act because of the veto, decisions of the UN General
Assembly or the NATO Council constitute appropriate authorization for the deployment of
military forces. The United States and the United Kingdom were cosponsors of the Uniting for
Peace Resolution in 1950, which allowed the General Assembly to act in crisis situations when
the Security Council could not act because of the inability of the permanent members to agree.
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Even their Western allies have opposed this view on occasion, and China and the Soviet Union
and later the Russian Federation have consistently opposed it, as have a number of developing
countries, including India.
France, Germany, and Italy initially maintained that explicit authorization by the UN
Security Council would be required for the NATO Council to authorize any out-of-area
military operation. Russia, China, and many other countries, including India, have consistently
maintained this position. Britain, in contrast to its allies, felt that international humanitarian law
provided an adequate legal basis. The United States assumed adequate authority from
Resolution 1199 in which the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
demanded that all parties in Kosovo "cease hostilities." NATO countries eventually were able
to build the required consensus to take a decision, but the legitimacy of this decision was
contested by states that were not members of NATO.
The broad issues of whether any institution other than the UN Security Council can
authorize the deployment of military forces and what constitutes legitimate grounds for
intervention within a state are far from resolved.3 Further unresolved are the possibilities of
these international bodies acting ultra vires, particularly in new areas for collective action. In
these cases, will procedures and requirements at the domestic level provide some check on the
possible unregulated use of force? Will disquiet over the smaller number of decision makers
wAithin bodies like the UN Security Council create problems of accountability for those states
excluded from such decision-making bodies?
NATIONAL AUTHORIZATION TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES
What events or processes need to be set into motion for countries to take part in military
operations under international auspices? Is there any difference in authorization whether an
operation is under international auspices or under a bilateral or other mandate? Does
accountability have to be provided through formal constitutional structures to meet the needs
of democracy, or can informal means fill this need?
Among the nine countries in our study, six have parliamentary systems-variants of the
British Westminster system. France, Russia, and the United States have presidential systems.
Yet, in all nine, there is heavy reliance on the executive to carry out the war power, and
considerable discretion is allowed the executive. Even in Japan, where separate legislative
action is required for the deployment overseas of the Japanese military, the Japanese Diet has
little formal means to intervene in the management of foreign affairs by the Cabinet
functioning as an executive.
Although the opportunity to pose challenges is available through the budget power and
question hour in the parliamentary systems, and through the inquiry power of legislatures in
the presidential systems, legislatures in all nine countries nevertheless are reluctant to question
the wisdom of an executive decision once troops are deployed, unless a problem arises as
occurred for the Americans and Canadians in Somalia, the Dutch in Srebrenica, and the French
in Yugoslavia. Legislative involvement in decisions to take part in operations, however, varies.
In Germany, Japan, and Russia specific legislative authorization for participation in military
operations is required; in the United States, Congress needs to be fully informed of actions
taken, and specific time limits are placed on what the president can do on his own.
There seems to be broad reliance on the national and international media in all countries
under study to ensure accountability to the general public. The criterion of transparency or
access to information is one of the criteria considered important to fostering and sustaining
democracy. At the same time, since public opinion can shift quickly, this may effectively
provide the executive wide latitude in pursuing policies regardless of specific legislative
'See the debate in FOREIGN AFFAIRs: Michael J. Glennon, The New Interventionism, FOREIGN AFF., May-June
1999, at 2, Thomas M. Franck et. al., Sidelined in Kosovo? The United Nations' Demise Has Been Exaggerated,
FOREIGN AFF., June-July 1999, at 116.
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involvement. Exceptions occur in the cases of the most complex and risky deployments, such
as the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.
In all of the countries in this study, there have been parliamentary discussions about the
use of force under the auspices of international institutions. Often these discussions have ended
with a resolution taking note of what the government was doing or planned to do. Such
resolutions carry the implicit threat that in some future instance the legislature could take a
negative decision.
Party politics are also in evidence as a factor in the accountability of decisions to take part
in military operations under international auspices. This perhaps is clearest in the case of
Germany as it struggled to clarify the framework within which German forces could be sent
outside the country. For historical reasons, the very existence of a German armed force was the
subject of deep political debate. The need to have a force under the NATO umbrella to face
possible attack from the Soviet Union answered that initial question.
However, how to provide for the deployment of German forces outside Germany was
another question. In a landmark decision, the German constitutional court decided in 1994 that
such deployments would be permissible as long as specific "constitutive approval" was granted
by the Bundestag for each deployment. This formula enabled the political parties to accept the
overall concept of deployment of German forces outside Germany by assuring the parties that
they would always have a voice in the decision to deploy.
Another emergifig voice in public opinion in the foreign affairs area is being raised by the
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), whose vociferous and concentrated advocacy can be
influential in conditioning public opinion to support military involvement overseas. NGO
influence differs from country to country. French NGOs have been especially vocal about
decisions for involvement while German and U.S. NGOs have principally functioned in
contractor roles involved in rebuilding and humanitarian assistance after a conflict.
Preliminary review of the country studies therefore suggests that democratic accountability
is exercised, but often in soft or informal ways rather than the more formal constitutional
means that are, nevertheless, available in all cases. As indicated above, informal forms include
political culture, contending political parties, leadership, social values, media, financial
constraints, and public opinion.4 Not only is public support necessary to sustain participation
in military operations; it can also can be a key to decisions to become involved, as has been
demonstrated in the cases of Japan and Germany.
Is the emerging trend Lori Damrosch describes of more involvement by legislatures the
only form of democratic accountability available? In his study for our project of the Canadian
experience, FenHampson suggests forms of "operational accountability" in which accountabil-
ity is ensured through finance and the management of operations once decisions are made to
take part. Karen Mingst, in her overview chapter on the politics of committing military forces
under the auspices of international institutions, concludes that accountability in democracies
is more than "legal accountability," and includes the indirect accountability of political culture
or the more direct accountability exercised by political or social actors within countries.
CIVILIAN CONTROL, CIvILIAN RESPONSIBILITY, MILITARY RESPONSIBILrrY
Civilian Control of the Military
How do national command structures work to provide communication between the
national civilian and military leaderships and their international counterparts? What about
target selection and international mandates for militarily dangerous missions?
What happens if there is a disagreement with the decision made by a non-national
commander? See, for example, the Clark/Jackson controversy over the taking ofPristina airport
in June 1999. On this last point, civilian control prevailed even at the expense of overruling the
' See Karen Mingst, Domestic Political Considerations and the Decision to Use Force under International
Auspices (Sept. 1999) (unpublished paper prepared for the ASIL Project on Accountability and the Use of Force under
International Auspices).
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senior commander of the operation. The British general, Michael Jackson, refused to obey an
order by the American general, Wesley Clark, to secure the airport. Jackson consulted the
British government, wx hich supported his refusal to obey the order, and the U.S. Government
refused to support Clark.
Although there has been less public discussion about issues of civilian control, it is a factor
identified as important to maintaining democracy./In both UN and NATO operations involving
militar, torces, lines of command have been established that ultimately involve military
commanders reporting to civilian authorities, usually the UN Secretary-General and Security
Council and the NATO Secretary-General and Council. These officials are in turn accountable
to the civilian authorities of member states-many of whom themselves would be subject to
accountability through the ballot box. The Kuwait operation was an exception in that a UN
chain of command was not established-the military forces involved operated under a broad
authorization given by the Security Council, but reported to their own civilian authorities.
The NATO operation against Serbia's actions in Kosovo, Operation Allied Force,
demonstrated the NATO Council's determination to maintain civilian control. Targets in the
air war were chosen by consensus among the civilian authorities of the allies. A plan to
interdict oil bound for Yugoslavia that the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO had
advocated was put on hold because of allied concerns about its legality.6
Civi/ian/Military Relations
This issue emanates from an assumption that civilian control accounts for responsible
consideration for the use and safety of the military. What happens if forces are perceived to be
in danger and more force is needed to ensure their safety? Political leaders who use military
force irresponsibly will suffer electoral punishment. The role of the military in decision making
may be a key to understanding the feasibility of a mission.
India's military appears very involved in such decisions, in part because of its size and the
related recognition of its political power. India, moreover, seems to have a tolerance for
casualties and has probably sustained the largest number of casualties of any country in
peacekeeping operations. Japan, conversely, provides little opportunity for military involve-
ment in the decision making about Japanese participation in military operations. The Japanese
media furthermore are zealous about monitoring and reporting Japanese participation in
oxerseas operations. For Canada, one of the recommendations made in 1997 by the
Commission of Inquiry to investigate charges of misconduct by Canadian soldiers in Somalia
xxwas to involve the military more fully in planning for any deployment of Canadian soldiers.
Respons ibilit" to Comply with International Norms
This section addresses the individual responsibility for conduct in the field and the
emerging international framework for discharging this responsibility through defined norms.
One such step was the UN Secretary-General's memo declaring that from 1999, military forces
operating under UN commands would be bound by international humanitarian law.' A further
step can be seen in the new legal and personal accountability provided through the proposed
international criminal court.
National institutions have also been important in ensuring that military personnel comport
themselxes in accordance with established norms with regard to military conduct. There were
major national inquiries into the conduct of the Dutch military forces in Srebrenica and the
Canadian military forces in Somalia. Canadian military personnel were prosecuted under
Canadian military law. Little exists now, however, beyond these national controls, although
ROBERT A. DHL, ON DEMOCRACY 147 (1998).
Sec Frederic L. Kirs, NATO Interdiction of Oil Tankers Bound for Yugoslavia, ASIL INStGnT (Apr. 1999),
, ,hauinhc rm <http:ia ww.asii.orglinsigh33.htm>; Phillippe Sands, Oil Blockage Threatens International Law of
itc Sca, ASIL LNSIGHT (Apr. 1999), obtainable from <http:/www.asil.org/insigh34.htm>.
SLJN/ST/SGB/1999I!3.
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia functions in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia and has undertaken a review of NATO actions in that territory.
THE ROLE OF INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN SHAPING THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY SYSTEM
Accountability and democracy are broad terms that apply both to international and national
actions and decision making. Democracy is a term that is used to describe both a set of ideals
and historical and contemporary political systems. As a concept, democracy means "govern-
ment by the people." Elaborating on this basic notion, Robert A. Dahl, one of the foremost
contemporary democratic theorists, stated that "a key characteristic of democracy is the
continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as
political equals."8
Although international decision-making processes are subject to standards of democracy
and accountability, they fall far short of meeting the criteria that are normally employed to
gauge these concepts. The emerging exception is in the European Union and possible criminal
responsibility as carried out by the mandates of either an ad hoe or permanent international
criminal tribunal or court. UN decisions to authorize the use of military forces beyond national
defense cannot be seen as meeting democratic criteria, but are important as a source of
legitimacy both internationally and for many democracies.
As can be seen from the account above, democratic accountability when military forces
are used under the auspices of international institutions has primarily been the responsibility
of national governments. National governments have responded in various ways. The United
States has been at one end of a continuum based on the extent to which the legislature is
involved, and India has been at the other. Their respective national constitutions established
procedures and traditions that have shaped the response of states. Only five of the nine
states-France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-included in our
study have used force unilaterally in the period since the end of World War II. For better or
worse, the means they employed to ensure democratic accountability when they used force
under the auspices of international institutions did not differ significantly from the means they
used when they employed force unilaterally.
Dahl has identified five criteria that a process for governing an association should meet
to be regarded as democratic?:
Effective participation. Before apolicyis adopted by the association, all the members must
have equal and effective opportunities for making their views known to the other members
as to what the policy should be.
Voting equality. When the moment arrives at which the decision about policy will finally
be made, every member must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and all votes
must be counted as equal.
Enlightened understanding. Within reasonable limits as to time, each member must have
equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant alternative policies and
their likely consequences.
Control of the agenda. The members must have the exclusive opportunity to decide how
and, if they choose, what matters are to be placed on the agenda. Thus, the democratic
process required by the three preceding criteria is never closed. The policies of the
association are always open to change by the members, if they so choose.
Inclusion of adults. All, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents should have the full
rights of citizens that are implied by the first four criteria. Before the twentieth century,
this criterion was unacceptable to most advocates of democracy.
These five criteria include those that most democratic theorists consider essential. Using more
popular language, democratic theorists would speak of freedom of association, assembly, and
8 ROBERTA. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971).
9 DAHL, supra note 5, at 37, 38.
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participation. They would speak of equality and majority rule. They would discuss forms of
representation and voting rules.
Although decision making on matters related to the use of force in the countries
represented in our study differs substantially among the countries, in each case it meets these
criteria, The criteria are fulfilled by combinations of the formal and informal forms of
accountability described above, including the media and public opinion.
NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE AND CAPACITY
Democracy addresses the processes by which laws are made. The interaction between
bodies of law-international and national-is also a consideration of our study. Lori
Damrosch's work notes that the first steps toward limiting the use of force were taken in
national constitutions:
Milestones along this path begin with the French Constitution of 1791-the first national
constitution to renounce wars of conquest-and include the renunciation of war in the
post-World War II constitutions of Germany and Japan, as well as other countries. Such
constitutional provisions have helped to consolidate the norm of general international law
against use of force embodied since 1945 in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations
Charter. National constitutional law in various countries likewise manifests the commit-
ment of those societies to carry out commitments to collective security made within the
framework of international organizations.
That the conflicts of today stem from intrastate rather than interstate violence is an
important difference, and tests a key assumption of international law-that states are sovereign
within their own territory. However, if the international law prohibiting genocide and providing
for human rights protection appears to overcome, or even requires overcoming, the concerns
of intervention in the internal affairs of states, new standards and procedures must be
developed if international relations are not to revert to the unregulated, unilateral, great-power
interventions of the nineteenth century. For countries whose constitutions accept international
law as part of national law, what changes to international law will be required to make national
action possible? In practice for these countries, is there a difference if the law stems from the
UN Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty? Will internal legislative controls help to modulate
the collective response?
Several actions taken in response to the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo indicate major
issues that remain unsettled for the future order for the use of military forces under
international institutions. The United Kingdom carefully argued that a right of intervention for
humanitarian purposes did not imply a duty to intervene. Norway could find no law to cover
its participation in the Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, but agreed to contribute forces on the
basis that this was a humanitarian operation. The Canadian government took the position that
there was no need for parliamentary debate in Canada until ground troops were introduced
because there was no "real war" until ground forces were involved. Each of these interpreta-
tions and justifications for participation in the Operation Allied Force left the participating
governments uneasy and in search of a more orderly way to respond to future humanitarian
crises. The NATO operation also made clear the disapproval of countries like India of the
undertaking in the absence of specific appropriate Security Council authorization.
Many countries' concerns ultimately stem from a worry that powerful states will abuse
their power at the expense of the less powerful. Yet, maintaining peace and security requires
power and effective power. This can be a particularly difficult task to undertake within a
multilateral framework when one power prevails over all others. Historical, political, and
structural factors further seem "to make even a benign hegemony appear to others as an
insufferable bully: the U.S. constitutional bias whereby domestic legislation takes precedence
over international commitments and whereby U.S. legislation can be applied extrater-
ritorially."" Several habits have taken root in the course of the twentieth century, however, that
Francois HeisbourgAmt rican Hegemony? Perceptions of the USAbroad, SURvIvAL, Winter 1999-2000, at9.
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make a difference and may prevent a return to previous practices. One is the habit of con-
sultation and seeking multilateral support and participation. Increasingly, even the most
powerful states appear hesitant to use military forces without some form of international
authorization, authorization that at a minimum involves some multilateral consensus. This
protracted consensus building may not provide for speedy response, but provides for time to
consider a measured response in cases other than the clear ones of invasion across borders. It
provides for appropriate parliamentary consultation where necessary. It also provides a
measure of protection against abuse by a single powerful military power."
Until clear systems for determining the legitimate grounds for intervention and procedures
for taking decisions about this are set up, the problem will remain one of"ad hoc opportunism"
by strong military powers.' International law is essential because it shapes the question of
whether force can and should be used by making clear what present law permits. How the
answers involving international law and its application will be tailored will inevitably grow out
of experience and the political process-international and national. This project looks within
national systems for some preliminary answers.
The system for authorizing the use of military forces under the auspices of international
institutions and then for supervising these forces when they are deployed is a far cry from the
vision of centralized control that Woodrow Wilson and others had in mind when they first
argued for the creation of a system of collective security. It is also much less centralized than
the concept that was embedded in the UN Charter. In actuality, it is a mixed system that
involves responsibility and decisions at both the international and the national levels.
Because of this, some might fear that it is both less effective at responding to violations
of the UN Charter and less accountable to individuals than it should be. On the one hand, the
insistence of national authorities that they be the ones who authorize the use of their military
forces in collective actions vitiates any notion that international institutions would automati-
cally deploy military forces any time that international law was violated. On the other hand,
the mixture of international and national decision making blurs elements of democratic
accountability.
One response to this critique is that however desirable a centralized system might be, the
present system is the one that states have been willing to accept. A stronger response is that
under present conditions, a centralized system could not meet the criteria of democratic
accountability. In addition, however imperfect the present system is, it has worked. Military
forces have been deployed fifty-eight times, two of these involved enforcement actions and
nine the use of force to ensure compliance with international mandates.
The present system can and should be improved. This should not obscure, however, the
significance of the progress that has been made. The project to prohibit the unilateral use of
military forces and to establish mechanisms for using military forces collectively has made
substantial progress since it was first undertaken at Versailles.
11 See, for example, the conclusion of Leonard Meeker, former Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State,
that "[w]hile the assertion of an international-law right to intervene to stop genocide would not have the backing of
a competent United Nations body, it would signify, being made by NATO, that the air war was not being prosecuted
on the decision of the United States alone, but with the concurrence of all nineteen members of NATO, This would
give the claim some multilateral character, however incomplete." Unpublished remarks, LAWS group (Apr. 29, 1999),
Washington, D.C.
" Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community after Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force, 89 AilL
74(1995).
